Short selling is measured in the literature as both constraint (lending fees) and activity (trades). We show that these two measures capture separate effects, which can be characterized as different strategies. The first strategy, "short trading," has minimal constraints, a weekly investment horizon and average risk. The second strategy, "short investing," has high constraints, a multi-month horizon and higher risk. Each strategy incorporates different types of information. Short trading includes short-lived information while short investing includes more long-lived information. Because our results show that short constraints are persistent, they have implications for future theoretical research.
There is a large literature, dating back to Miller (1977) , that has shown how short selling constraints predict negative stock returns (e.g., Asquith and Meulbroek (1996) , Asquith, Pathak, and Ritter (2005) , Nagel (2005) , Boehme, Danielsen, and Sorescu (2006) ). The framework is simple: given a distribution of investors with varying beliefs, short constraints inhibit the most pessimistic investors from participating in financial markets, and therefore, on average, the stock is overpriced compared to the unconstrained alternative. Data availability (monthly short interest, quarterly institutional ownership, sporadic daily lending fees), has forced this literature to use low frequency observations. Additionally, Dechow et al. (2001) showed that short sellers identify stocks with low valuation ratios, which exhibit negative returns over the subsequent year. Taken together, this literature shows that short-selling demand (as measured by constraints) conveys significant negative information about a firm at a low frequency.
There is also a literature showing that short selling activity, defined as trades or trading volume labeled as short sales, predicts negative returns at a daily or weekly frequency (e.g., Diether, Lee, and Werner (2009) , Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang (2008) ). Moreover, Christophe, Ferri, and Angel (2004) show that short selling activity prior to earnings announcements is closely linked to post-announcement returns. Christophe, Ferri, and Hsieh (2010) find increased abnormal short activity prior to analyst downgrades and show that this activity is related to postdowngrade returns. Engelberg, Reed, and Ringgenberg (2012) investigate short trade volume in the days around news events and find short sellers do not necessarily anticipate news, but short sellers are able to process the information better, resulting in a stronger negative relationship between short selling concurrent with negative news and future returns. Overall, this literature on short selling activity has made two main points. First, it shows that short selling activity predicts negative returns over short horizons, consistent with the (lower frequency) literature on short selling constraints. Second, it further clarifies how short sellers are informed traders by focusing on short seller behavior around informative events.
While clearly related, the precise relationship between these two literatures has not been investigated. Indeed, some suggest that the only difference between these two literatures is time scale (monthly vs daily/weekly).
1 This may be true: tautologically, substantial cumulative short selling activity (i.e. trades) is a necessary condition for a short selling constraint to bind. Thus, the negative returns documented in both of these literatures could be due to two measured effects 1 See, for example, Engelberg, Reed, and Ringgenberg (2012) footnote 14.
(short selling constraints and short trades), both of which proxy for the same underlying phenomenon (negative information/beliefs among a segment of investors). This is our null hypothesis.
Our alternative hypothesis, for which we find ample evidence, is that the two measurements (activity and constraints) are capturing two different behaviors. The short selling literature typically measures constraints as stock loan fees that fall above the 90 th percentile threshold, or ~100 bps annualized (e.g. Blocher, Reed, and Van Wesep (2013) ). Because the distribution of loan fees is exponential, this means that borrowing shares of a constrained stock can be very expensive. At such high fees, basic economics dictates that few transactions should take place, and therefore short selling activity should be low when a stock is short constrained.
This is the very definition of the word 'constrained.' Our alternative hypothesis then states that short selling activity should only effectively generate short-horizon stock price reductions when short selling is unconstrained. Additionally, when a stock is short constrained, positive stock returns should not predict short activity due to the constraints on that activity. In summary, our alternative hypothesis is that the two measurements of short selling demand identify distinct effects.
The primary obstacle to investigating the interaction of short selling constraints and short selling activity has been data availability for both measures. First, we address measures of short activity. Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang (2008) , Christophe, Ferri, and Angel (2004) , Christophe, Ferri, and Hsieh (2010) all use proprietary data and limited length (often approximately a year of data). Diether, Lee, and Werner (2009) and Engelberg, Reed, and Ringgenberg (2012) Since short selling constraints are measured at a monthly frequency, the short time period for
Regulation SHO limits the sample to 30 observations per firm for short selling constraints, making statistical inference difficult.
We overcome this obstacle by developing a new measure of short selling activity using existing, known data. Specifically, we measure short selling activity as the daily change in shares demanded for stock loans using the daily stock loan demand data from Markit. Our measure is a net short selling activity measure, since daily demand is an aggregation of new stock loans plus existing stock loans minus closed stock loans. This netting effect contrasts with short selling activity measures in the literature, which simply identify short trades and cannot identify covering trades. Delineating between net short-selling activity and net covering activity should strengthen the economic intuition of our tests. 3 To validate our new measure, we show that it replicates both of the main results in Diether, Lee, and Werner (2009) . That is, our new measure shows that positive stock returns predict short selling activity and short selling activity predicts negative returns, all at a horizon of five days.
To do our analysis at a daily frequency, we need a daily measure of short selling constraints that is consistent with the extant monthly-frequency literature. This is our second data challenge since most existing measures (such as short interest) are monthly and daily stock lending fees are noisy and populated sporadically in the Markit data. Thus, we use a moving average of the Daily Cost to Borrow Score (DCBS) in Markit. To be conservative in identifying a true short constraint, we require DCBS > 1 every day in a 42-day trailing moving average window to define a stock as short constrained. We compare our more rigorous measure to existing short constraint measures, such as average monthly loan fees, and find that our short constraint measure captures the known results in the literature more robustly and with less statistical noise. 4 This definition is also quite helpful in an event study specification to capture the state of short constraints on day T−10 ahead of our event window.
For our main analysis, we divide our sample into three groups: persistently constrained (or constrained), transiently constrained (or transient), and unconstrained. Unconstrained stocks are defined as DCBS = 1 for the entire period, constrained stocks are DCBS > 1 for the entire period (as discussed above), and transient are all others in between. We split short activity into quintiles daily spanning from high short activity (top quintile) down to high covering activity (bottom quintile).
3 Blocher and Ringgenberg (2018) show that covering often happens soon after shorting, such that high short volume may be offset by (unobserved) covering transactions. Thus, a net measure will capture the aggregate effect, similar to order imbalances, for example. In addition, intraday short volume transactions (captured by the Reg SHO data) contain a lot of uninformative short selling, for example ETF arbitrage trades and other high frequency algorithmic arbitrage trades. These are not identified in the data and therefore cannot be excluded. 4 We also show it is robust to different definitions, such as 1 month, 3 months, and 80% of days having DCBS>1 (rather than 100%). Any of these perform better than average monthly loan fees.
We begin our analysis by simply considering observation frequency. How often do we observe that a stock is short constrained and also experiencing significant short selling activity?
Very rarely. This combination represents only 1.8% of our entire sample. For comparison, 7.7% of our sample is short constrained and 20% of our sample has high (net) short selling activity.
This simple, univariate evidence supports our primary hypothesis that activity and constraints are capturing separate phenomena. To provide robust evidence, we turn to a multivariate, panel specification. When we subdivide the sample into the three constraint-based groups, positive returns only predict short selling activity and short activity predicts negative returns only among unconstrained stocks. In both cases, predictability disappears when stocks are short constrained.
This result implies two short selling strategies which we call short trading and short investing, and the remainder of this paper characterizes them. 5 Short trading is, in brief, a short horizon strategy in unconstrained stocks, while short investing is a longer-term strategy in short constrained stocks. To be clear, our goal in this analysis is to clarify differences in the two short selling literatures that proxy short demand using constraints and activity. We do not attempt to make causal statements about short constraints or otherwise address the endogeneity inherent among short constrained stocks, in particular. In this aim, we follow the bulk of the existing short selling literature.
We begin by investigating the riskiness of these two strategies. Short investing has a higher risk profile: short constrained stocks have volatility ranging from 63-72% annualized.
Unconstrained stocks targeted by the short trading strategy have a more standard volatility, approximately 40-41% annualized on average. Short selling risk (Engelberg, Reed, and Ringgenberg (2017) ) is an order of magnitude higher among short constrained stocks compared to unconstrained stocks. Combining the two risk measures, the short investing strategy is substantially riskier than short trading.
Next, we consider investment horizons. We find that the negative relationship between short activity and returns weakens and then disappears with increasing investment horizon (from one week to eight weeks). In contrast, the negative relationship between short selling constraints and subsequent return strengthens with increasing investment holding period. Indeed, when we further investigate short constraints, we find that they are quite persistent, lasting on average 9 months. We further robustly show that monthly short constraints as typically measured literature are fully explained by our measure of persistent short selling constraints. In summary, our results on investment horizon show clearly that short trading is a short horizon strategy, approximately one week, and short investing is a long horizon strategy requiring a holding period of approximately 5-9 months.
To study each strategy's information environment, we analyze activity around analyst downgrades and earnings announcements across the three short selling constraint groups. First, among analyst downgrades we find strong evidence of high short activity ahead of analyst downgrades in the pooled sample and within each constraint subsample. 6 However, short selling on the announcement day is an order of magnitude higher among constrained stocks than unconstrained and the largest negative event returns are among constrained stocks, almost 50%
higher than the other groups (−3.6% vs −1.9%, daily). After the event, there is covering activity equal to the prior shorting activity among unconstrained stocks. However, among constrained stocks, there is massive covering activity, with 13.96% of volume representing covering trades from day T+3 to T+10 (compared to 4.3% both in the pooled sample and among unconstrained stocks). This substantial post-event covering activity is evidence that large short positions must have been in place prior to our measurement window.
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These combined results around analyst downgrades are consistent with informed short sellers, but with two different meanings of 'informed.' The longer-term short investing strategy takes a position before the downgrade window (prior to T−10) and therefore is trading on negative information from the firm's fundamentals (e.g. Dechow et al. (2001) ) or other longlived information. In this case, the downgrade is simply the analyst (and perhaps other stock owners) catching up to what this short investor already knew prior to the event. This is consistent 6 For the analyst downgrade and earnings announcement results, we adjust for the fact that among constrained and unconstrained subsamples of stocks, the null hypothesis cannot be that short activity is zero. Constrained stocks, because they are at a high level of short demand, have on average net covering. Unconstrained stocks, since they are at a low level of short demand, have on average net shorting. Thus, these conclusions are based on tests of the averages coefficient value computed against the bootstrapped mean value, with corresponding recomputed tstatistics. We discuss this more in the results section. 7 We find the same result when we compute short activity divided by shares outstanding, which actually provides a better basis for this conclusion, since the denominator is very likely unchanged over the event window. This conclusion is weaker when normalized by daily volume as we report here. We report all results normalized by daily volume because that is more easily comparable to the literature, but our results go through when we divide by shares outstanding as well.
with the much larger negative event return. In contrast, the short trading strategy incorporates the short-term negative information in unconstrained stocks ahead of analyst downgrades, and covers immediately after. This is consistent with Christophe, Ferri, and Hsieh (2010) , who claim that trading ahead of analyst downgrades is a kind of 'leakage' where analysts tip off traders who then trade just ahead of the event. Thus, these two short selling strategies trade on different information in different groups of stocks (constrained vs not), but both profit off of their information advantage ahead of analyst downgrades.
Second, we look at negative earnings surprises. Overall, we find no measurable short activity or covering activity among constrained stocks in any time interval. Only among unconstrained stocks do we find short selling ahead of the earnings announcement, which is a refinement of the results in Christophe, Ferri, and Angel (2004) . In addition, rather than covering, we find more short selling after the event, likely trading on the well-documented postearnings announcement drift phenomenon. When considering announcement returns, the magnitudes are similar across subsamples. Because there is no measured short selling among constrained stocks ahead of the event, negative event returns are once again consistent with a short investing strategy that is in place ahead of the announcement (prior to our event window), set to profit from expected poor earnings. Similarly, we see a short trading strategy only among the unconstrained stocks, where a short sale a few days before the event can capture the expected event return.
Overall, these results around risk, horizon, and information indicate two different short selling strategies. The short investing strategy requires fundamental information about firms, paying high loan fees, and a greater risk tolerance over a months-long holding period. This short selling strategy is best identified with measures of short selling constraints, which are persistent over 5-9 months on average. On the other hand, a short trading strategy identifies shorter duration deviations in stock price or trades around events such as downgrades and earnings announcements. It requires much lower fees, a shorter holding period, and are only requires information about short-run movements in stock prices.
We further solidify these findings by investigating price efficiency using the Delay measure in Hou and Moskowitz (2005) . We confirm the findings in Boehmer and Wu (2013) , who show that short selling activity measures help improve price efficiency. However, we further show that this effect disappears when stocks are short constrained, consistent with Saffi and Sigurdsson (2011) . This is unsurprising given that the Delay measure is a short-term (weekly) measure of price efficiency and short activity impacts prices over that horizon. Because short activity loses is efficacy when the stock is constrained, it no longer impacts price efficiency at the weekly (or shorter) frequency. It is also possible that short investors also help price efficiency over longer (months-long) horizons, but to show this, a long-term measure of price efficiency needs to be developed. We leave this for future research.
Our results are consistent with Ljungqvist and Qian (2016) , who investigate short selling campaigns. Short selling campaigns, defined as public campaigning around overpriced stocks, receive tremendous amounts of attention in the business press and these campaigns can persist for months, and even years. Typically, after the short seller establishes her position, she publicly argues that the firm has, for example, fundamental flaws with the business strategy, misleading disclosures or outright fraud. 8 These features capture the idea of a long-horizon short investor and are likely to be captured with our short constraint measurement proxy.
Overall, our results are intuitive. The literature investigating short selling activity (trades, volume, etc.) has always used a pooled sample. Therefore, it stands to reason that the documented effects in that literature exist primarily among unconstrained stocks, which make up the vast majority of observations in any given panel data set (at any frequency). In contrast, the literature on short selling constraints has always focused on the tail of the distribution, either with subsamples (Asquith, Pathak, and Ritter (2005) ) or by using indicator variables to identify expensive stocks (Blocher, Reed, and Van Wesep (2013) 
II. Hypothesis Development, Data, and Measurements
We have briefly delineated our hypotheses in the introduction, but we develop them more fully in this first section. Next, we describe our data set.
A. Hypothesis Development
8 And firms fight back, see Lamont (2012) .
It is true that absent large negative shifts in supply, some amount of short selling volume must precede the existence of a short selling constraint (as measured by high stock loan prices).
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However, this tautology alone does not justify a hypothesis that short selling volume and short selling constraints are both measuring the same underlying phenomenon. The timing does not align for them to be measuring the same thing at a monthly frequency.
The results in the literature (e.g., Diether, Lee, and Werner (2009) (2005)), then the only way for both short volume and short constraints to be measuring the same latent phenomenon is if they are concurrent in time. Said differently, there must be some measurable short trading volume happening while a stock is 'constrained' as typically measured.
Our alternative hypothesis is simply that short selling activity and short selling constraints measure two separate effects. However, "separate" could mean two different things.
First, it could mean that short activity predicts negative returns, but that the state of short constraints is irrelevant. In addition, we could show that short constraints predict negative returns, but the state of short activity is irrelevant. In this case, there is overlap between the two, but it is randomly distributed -i.e. they are not measuring the same thing but there may be incidental overlap. We call this the "independence" hypothesis. Second, "separate" could mean two non-intersecting events. Event 1 is that short activity does predict negative returns only when stocks are not constrained, and Event 2 is that short activity does not predict negative returns only when stocks are constrained. We call this the "disjoint" hypothesis, because each result only exists in isolation from the other.
To begin our analysis of these hypotheses graphically, we provide two examples in (Geczy, Musto, and Reed (2002) ), they start off already short 9 Cohen, Diether, and Malloy (2007) showed that stock loan supply is not important in predicting stock returns.
constrained due to the combination of low institutional ownership (i.e. low stock loan supply) and the lockup period for insiders. The lockup expired in December 2011, however, and the stock remains persistently short constrained until January 2013, over a year later, so IPO lockup is not the only underlying factor.
Of note for our purposes is the two patterns in short constraints, which are a function of lending fees (and hence stock loan demand and stock loan supply) and short activity, which is a measure of day-to-day short selling (measured by changes in stock loan quantity). Our short constraint measure is shown with the orange line and divides the time series into two periods.
The early period is constrained, the later period is not. Panels D and E shows short selling activity. In Panel E, the dark red series shows the raw measure of short selling activity, defined as the change in quantity demanded (daily short interest) divided by total daily volume. The black line is a 42-day moving average to smooth the noise. We choose 42 days because that is the same horizon as the short constraint measure. In Panel D in green is an indicator for high short selling activity each day. This measure is generated from the upper quintile of short activity, defined as change in short interest divided by total daily volume, ranked each day. The purple series in Panel D is an indicator for high covering activity, which is measured the same, but the bottom quintile of the raw short activity measure (changes in daily short interest).
The most fundamental observation is that short selling activity (Panel E, as well as the green and purple series in Panel D), is largely unaffected by short constraints (Panel B and C).
What is abundantly clear is that short selling and short covering are closely related to each other, that short selling activity is a noisy process, and that short selling and covering occur regardless of short constraints.
To show that this is not anomalous or simply related to a profitable, new technology firm (or its IPO), we present another example in Figure 2 . Here, we show the same set of plots for Visually, this is evidence for our "independence" hypothesis. It seems that short selling is not materially constricted during periods of high loan fees, which goes against our "disjoint" hypothesis. It is also clear that short activity is not isolated to periods of short constraint, which goes against our null hypothesis. However, the question remains about return predictability: are the results in the literature showing that short selling activity predicts negative returns isolated to situations of constraint or unconstraint? To answer this question, we need a more rigorous analysis. First, we describe our data.
B. Data
The timeframe for this study is June 2006 to September 2016, with a daily frequency. We begin with the ordinary common shares (SHRCD of 10 or 11) of all firms in the Center for
Research in Security Prices (CRSP) dataset and focus on stocks that had a median stock price above five dollars. For the Fama-French abnormal return portfolio benchmarks, we compute market capitalization and book-to-market groups using the NYSE breakpoints from Ken French's website. We compute the market-to-book ratio as in Daniel and Titman (2006) , with market values taken from CRSP as of the end of December in the firm's fiscal year.
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Our primary securities lending dataset is for the North American equity loan market from Markit (formerly Data Explorers), which includes data from 125 large custodians and 32 prime brokers in the securities lending industry. The data coverage is quite large, accounting for about 80% of U.S. equities, and 85% of the securities lending market. This dataset provides detailed information on each stock's demand, supply, and lending fees in the equity lending market.
The Markit dataset also contains two important borrowing cost variables. The first borrowing cost variable is the Daily Cost to Borrow Score (DCBS). The DCBS is a 1-10 integer categorization that describes how expensive a stock is to borrow, with 1 being the cheapest and 10
being the most expensive. The scores are computed by Markit for each stock-day and are based on actual lending fees that they receive from securities dealers but are not allowed to re-distribute.
The second is indicative lending fees, which we use to compute short selling risk.
We compute two risk measures. The first is volatility, which is compute daily for the trailing 252 days, and then annualized. The second is the short selling risk measure of Engelberg, Reed, and Ringgenberg (2017) , which is also computed daily from 252 day trailing data. Rather than use the predicted value from their regression, however, we use the simple unconditional measure of risk, which is historical loan fee variance. Engelberg, Reed, and Ringgenberg (2017) show in their appendix that this approach is more parsimonious and leads to the same inference.
Our analyst downgrades data comes from Institutional Brokers' Estimate System (I/B/E/S), using the I/B/E/S Recommendations Detail File over the period July 2006 to September 2016.
Following Christophe, Ferri, and Hsieh (2010) and Mikhail, Walther, and Willis (2004) , we restrict our sample based on the following criteria. First, during the sample period, the stock price has to be at least $5 on the downgrade date. Second, there are no other downgrades in the preceding week and no quarterly earnings announcement in the preceding or following week. Third, we exclude downgrades that transitioning from "Strong Buy" to "Buy". Fourth, we only include the downgrades where the time difference between current and prior recommendation is less than 365
11 When we test our short constraint measure against measures in the literature, we move to a monthly frequency using the same data, though we end in December 2015 for that analysis. This slight difference is immaterial for our results.
days. Finally, we require non-missing information of share price, total shares outstanding, volume, and stock return during our sample period. In case a downgrade occurs on a non-trading day, the following trading day will be coded as though it were the downgrade day.
Summary statistics for our dataset are in Table I . Short selling activity has a slightly negative mean implying that we observe slightly more net covering of short positions over our sample, though this mean is not significantly different from zero. Approximately 7.7% of the firm-days are persistently constrained by our measure in the pooled sample. That is, 7.7% of firm-day observations have experienced higher fees to borrow the stock over the last 42 trading days. Approximately 74.3% of firm-days in the sample are unconstrained, which is to say they have had low stock loan fees for the past 42 days. The remainder, transient, represents firm-days that have had at least one day over the past 42 days in which it was expensive to borrow the stock. These observations make up the remaining 18% of the sample.
III. Measures of Short Activity and Short Constraints
We measure daily short selling activity as the change in daily shares lent (Total Demand Quantity in Markit), divided by volume. By definition, our measure omits trades that are covered intraday. This is because our measure derives from loan data, and shorts that are covered within the same day do not require a stock loan. Intraday shorts will show up in exchange-provided trade data such as that required by Regulation SHO, but intraday short trades cannot be differentiated and so must be included. Diether (2016) can identify intraday vs multi-day trades and chooses to omit the former, so we conclude that missing this information is not important.
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Because our measure is a net measure, we also capture net covering activity (i.e. changes where short interest is decreasing on net). Therefore, to sharpen our analysis we create two asymmetric measures of activity, where we split activity into short activity and cover activity.
Short Activity keeps positive values of the raw measure, with all negative values set to zero, Cover Activity is the convers. Thus, our primary Short Activity measure is a weakly positive variable and helps isolate the effects of shorting activity from cover activity. This way, a reported coefficient must be due to increasing or decreasing net short selling activity and is in no way related to covering. As additional justification, Blocher and Ringgenberg (2018) show that short sellers may cover inefficiently, and so we want to omit this behavior and focus solely on 12 See Blocher and Ringgenberg (2018) for more discussion and comparison of the Markit vs RegSHO datasets.
the initial short sale. For econometric reasons, when we use Short Activity as an explanatory variable, we include as a control variable the mirror-image Cover Activity variable that includes only net covering observations with positive observations zeroed out, such that the sum of the two recovers the original, centered variable. This helps satisfy the normality assumption about the residuals in a multiple regression specification.
To our knowledge, our measure of short selling activity is new, though it derives from existing data. Typically, short selling activity has been measured directly using trades identified as short sales from the exchanges themselves, either during the Regulation SHO pilot (January 2005 -July 2007) or by FINRA requirement since 2010. However, this most recent data no longer seems to capture results around short selling activity in the literature, which we address in detail in the Appendix. Therefore, we need a new measure to capture short activity.
Our measure of short constraints is also new, but we will show it to be a significant improvement on the existing measures. Not only is it available at a daily frequency, but it better predicts the results already existing in the literature, while the original measure is left with no statistical or economic significance, only noise. Starting with daily data, we create an indicator for days where stock lending fees were high, DCBS > 1. We then take a moving average of the indicator over the previous 42 trading days. If the moving average is exactly equal to one then this implies that the stock has been persistently expensive to borrow and we therefore label it as CONST for constrained. To contrast our constrained variable, we classify stocks as being unconstrained (UNCONST) when the trailing moving average equals zero. This means that DCBS = 1 for every day in that period. All days with the trailing moving average between 0 and 1 we label as transient (TRANS), since they were transiently or temporarily short constrained.
To compare our constraint measure to the literature, we move to a monthly frequency, which matches the frequency of observation typical in the literature measuring short constraints.
Recall that our measure is a daily measure over the 42 trailing trading days. For comparability, when moving to a monthly frequency, we require every trading day in the current and previous month to have DCBS > 1 to be constrained and DCBS = 1 to be unconstrained. All others are in the transient category. Table II shows a frequency diagram of our different constraint measures, also divided into bins by monthly average lending fee. The cutoff most often used in the literature for a stock on special is 100 bps, so that is an important point of reference and the cutoff for the first bin. 98.99% of the unconstrained sample is in the 100 bps or less category, and the remaining 1.01% is in the 300 bps or less category. Manual inspection of these few observations shows their lending fee to be very close to 100 (less than 125 bps). Similarly, only 1.21% of constrained observations have lending fees of 100 bps or less, and again manual inspection shows them all to be close to 100 bps (greater than 95 bps). These small deviations are likely due to varying definitions of the DCBS categories, which are set by Markit and not available to us.
Next, staying with the monthly frequency for now, we show that our measure of constraints is more accurate than those typically used in the literature. We follow Jones and Lamont (2002) and set a SPECIAL indicator when monthly average loan fees are 100 bps or more. We compare this SPECIAL measure to our constraint measure in Table III . There, we perform a typical monthly short constraints regression with leading monthly return as the dependent variable and constraints measured at time T (along with other control variables) as independent variables. Control variables include the market-to-book ratio, market capitalization, trailing annualized volatility, bid-ask spread, and both time T and T−1 returns. These results use a panel regression with month and firm clustered standard errors and fixed effects, but the results are the same in a Fama-MacBeth specification (available in the Appendix).
The first row is the SPECIAL indicator, which is only negative and significant in Model 1. After that, in Model 2 and 3 we include our measure of constraint, which uses two months of trading days all with DCBS > 1. It is negative and significant both by itself and when included with the typical SPECIAL variable. In Models 4-7, we vary the definition of the indicator since our threshold is reasonable but ultimately arbitrary. Slightly varying our definition of constrained does not change the result -all of the other models show that some measure of persistent short constraints predicts negative returns better than the typical SPECIAL measure.
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We next move to another joint calibration exercise since both measures of short activity and short constraints are new to the literature. What we show is that cumulative short activity predicts short selling constraints. Recall that our constraint measure is based on loan fees. High loan fees inhibit short selling and should result from cumulative high demand. Separately, our short activity measure is based on changes in daily short interest, or loans demanded, so the link between our activity and constraint measures is not mechanical. We are showing that our measure is not picking up noise or some other unobserved variable by capturing this expected relationship.
The calibration is in Table IV . We find a positive and significant relationship between lagged (not contemporaneous) activity and constraints. The empirical regression asks how activity today predicts becoming constrained in the next two months in a linear probability model with a dependent variable taking the value of one if the stock is constrained forty-two trading days ahead. Because our definition of constraint relies on a high lending fee for the previous forty-two trading days, we use the indicator forty-two days in the future to avoid conflating the two. Hence, we run the following regression
for stock i on day t. We include controls for stock characteristics capturing liquidity, trading, and return moments, as well as firm and day fixed effects. Moreover, we double cluster standard errors along the firm and day dimensions. We find that more activity leads to a greater likelihood of becoming constrained. In an economic sense, we see that a one standard deviation increase in shorting activity leads to a 0.2% increase in the likelihood of becoming constrained. Recall that the unconditional probability of becoming persistently constrained is about eight percent, so this is a relative increase of around 3%. Note further that we are measuring a single day's impact of a measure spanning the subsequent 42 days. We also see that times of greater trading activity and slightly higher volatility are associated with an increased likelihood of becoming constrained. On the whole, this validates our measure of short selling activity because we can show that constraints are preceded by greater amounts of activity.
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III. Short Activity versus Short Constraints
Having established our new measures of short activity and short constraints, we now turn to our result clarifying the relationship between the identified effects from each measure. We begin with a simple frequency table in Table V . The first item to note is that 74.3% of the sample is in the unconstrained category in Panel B, which is consistent with past literature. We separate activity into quintiles on a daily basis so each grouping of activity represents approximately 20% of the sample, as seen by the last column (Total) in Panel B.
Only 1.8% is both Highest Short Activity and Constrained. Overall, this analysis shows that the important difference in the data is by column, when sorted by short selling constraint.
The sorts into activity generate a trough-shaped pattern for constrained stocks (column 1), but the magnitudes are quite small (1.9% max vs 1.4% min). If short selling activity and short selling constraints were both measuring the same phenomenon, our null hypothesis, we would expect an overweighting of observations in the upper left corner of the table, where both are present. That we do not find this previews our results that the two measures are separate phenomena, rejecting the null. This result provides more backup for the "independence" hypothesis rather than the "disjoint" hypothesis, but it is still not statistically rigorous.
We begin our multivariate analysis by testing whether high returns lead to short selling activity, and then whether short selling activity predicts negative returns, similar to the setup in Diether, Lee, and Werner (2009) . We then split our analysis into subsets based on the varying degrees of short selling constraints leading into the test. This is then a test of our hypotheses. If we find statistically significant results for activity only where stocks are short constrained, then we conclude that the null hypothesis is correct: both measures identify the same underlying phenomena. If we find statistically significant results for activity only among unconstrained stocks, then we conclude that the "disjoint" hypothesis is correct: constraints and activity measure two distinct, non-overlapping phenomena. If we find a statistically significant relationship in all cases, then that supports the "independence" hypothesis that they are separate but overlapping.
First, we investigate whether high short selling activity follows positive returns among constrained or unconstrained stocks. The first set of results are in Table VI , where we use our baseline measure of Short Activity, which is the change in daily shares demanded, scaled by volume. The primary variable of interest is Past Return [-5,-1] , which is the cumulative raw return over the five days previous to day t−1. It is positive and significant in every specification except (5), the subsample of constrained stocks (CONST). There, the t-statistic is 1.24. This compares to the unconstrained sample, which has a t-statistic of 33.22. Hence, the lack of a result stems from both economic and statistical significance. Model (1) and (2) are baseline specifications using the entire sample, which give a positive and significant coefficient on Past
Return, consistent with Diether, Lee, and Werner (2009).
Next, we investigate the variation in how short activity predicts negative returns. To better understand whether activity is always predictive of future returns, we again split our sample into constraint subsets. There is reason to believe that activity might be even more predictive during times of constraint because establishing positions when the cost is high might be more informative about future returns. On the other hand, the relatively low level of activity in constrained stocks may not add any additional information.
The results are in Table VII . The dependent variable is the cumulative raw return from day t+2. The primary explanatory variable of interest is Short Activity, as described above.
Models (1) and (2) show the main result present in the literature in the pooled sample: short selling activity predicts negative returns. Consistent with Blocher and Ringgenberg (2018), we also find that Cover Activity predicts negative returns. Recall that covering activity is a weakly negative variable, and it becomes more negative with more net covering. So a positive coefficient indicates that more covering (a more negative variable) is associated with greater negative returns. 15 In model (3), we subsample to include only unconstrained stocks (UNCONST) and find virtually identical results, though with slightly less economic and statistical significance. Transient stocks show a slightly larger economic effect but statistically much weaker, with a t-statistic of −1.85 versus −3.62. Finally, for constrained stocks, we find the coefficient shows no significant predictability from activity, whether short activity or covering activity. In untabulated results, we find very similar effects looking at a window from days t+2 to t+5 and for Fama-French 25 portfolio adjusted returns.
Taking the short-selling activity and return predictability together, it appears that among constrained stocks, the relationship between returns and activity is suppressed. A high cost to borrow may inhibit a trader's ability to express his beliefs through short selling. Similarly, the types of information which generate this short-term predictability may no longer be profitable after high borrowing costs. Thus, our multivariate results primarily back up our "disjoint"
hypothesis, that short activity and short constraints are distinct and non-overlapping.
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It is not problematic that there exists short activity while stocks are short constrained, as we saw graphically and in the univariate results. What we show instead is that this activity is not what is driving the results in the literature regarding short activity correcting short-horizon overpricing. Instead, it would seem to instead be longer-horizon trades that do not impact prices in the short run.
IV. Strategies: Short Trading and Short Investing
Having established that the two measures of short selling in the literature (activity and constraints) are identifying two different phenomena, we now attempt to better characterize the differences. We will do this by drawing contrasts in three areas: risk, investment horizon (holding period) and information set.
It is clear that short selling is risky (e.g., Engelberg, Reed, and Ringgenberg (2017) ).
However, Engelberg, Reed, and Ringgenberg (2017) focus primarily on longer holding periods and their results use a monthly frequency. This strongly implies that they are only analyzing short sellers who end up constrained, not those measured with high short selling activity measures. Taken together, this would imply that the benefits to information gathering (e.g. in Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang (2008) , etc.) do not pair with the risks faced by short sellers in Engelberg, Reed, and Ringgenberg (2017) , but this relationship is as of yet untested. We do so.
Second, there is an implied distinction between the literature on short selling activity and short selling constraints with regards to investment horizon (or holding period, observation frequency, etc.). In the literature, measures of short activity (trading volume) are higher frequency, while measures of short constraints (loan fees) are lower frequency. We will attempt to be more thorough in measuring the precise time horizon over which each measure retains its predictability of future negative returns, which to our knowledge is a gap in the literature. 16 Again, for full transparency, we find slightly different results if we divide our activity measure by shares outstanding. There, we find that short activity does predict negative returns in the constrained sample, though the results are substantially weakened, economically and statistically. Positive returns still do not predict short activity, however, so we conclude that this short activity under constraint cannot be characterized as short-term trading, but rather part of what we later call longer-term short investing behavior. Taken at face value, this result is evidence for the independence hypothesis over the disjoint hypothesis.
Third, we know that short sellers are informed, but this is a broad term. Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang (2008) show that short sellers are primarily institutional investors, a group typically seen as sophisticated. Christophe, Ferri, and Hsieh (2010) and Christophe, Ferri, and Angel (2004) show that short sellers anticipate analyst downgrades and earnings announcements, respectively. Dechow et al. (2001) show that high short interest is associated with firms having weak fundamentals (e.g. book-to-market). These are all ways of describing short sellers as informed, but are they describing the same short sellers? We begin to address this question here.
Our goal in this section is to better characterize what we suggest are two distinct short selling strategies, each identified by one of the two short selling measures. We call the first strategy short trading, which we measure with short activity, and we call the second strategy short investing, which we measure with short constraints.
A. Risk tolerance
A key differentiating characteristic among market participants is risk aversion. Thus, it is natural to ask if these two short selling strategies, short trading and short investing, have different risk profiles.
Risk in short selling has two dimensions, both important. One is the stock volatility, a standard measure for any investor. However, volatility should loom even larger for short sellers due to the inherent leverage in their position. If the price goes against them (i.e. up), then they will be required to put up more collateral for their stock loan. This is directly analogous to a leveraged long position, where margin calls can force liquidation at an inopportune time. The second dimension of risk for short sellers is lending fee variance, or short selling risk, as coined by Engelberg, Reed, and Ringgenberg (2017) . This is, very simply, the risk that lending fees, which are set daily, may rise over the course of holding a short position, making it gradually more expensive to hold, possibly leading to inefficient, premature covering.
Our goal is to measure the riskiness of short investing versus short trading. First, we look at some simple univariate statistics in Table VIII . Panel A shows results for short selling risk, and it is clear that the constrained stocks have short selling risk that is an order of magnitude higher than any other category. In the bottom row (in the pooled sample, ignoring Short Activity subsamples), short selling risk is 352.0 among constrained stocks but just 25.0 among unconstrained stocks. This pattern holds regardless of short selling activity subsample. In Panel B, we see the same pattern in volatility. The "total" row at the bottom shows that volatility among constrained stocks is 66.8%, but among unconstrained stocks it is just 40.5%.
Next, we test these differences in a multivariate setting. We set up the test from the perspective of a short seller, ex ante, sizing up the risk of a possible short position. Specifically, we test if trailing measures of risk predict short selling constraints. Table IX shows the results, using a leading measure of persistent constraints (at T+42) as the dependent variable. The results are striking, though not surprising given what we know already. There is a positive and significant relationship between both volatility and short selling risk and subsequent constraints in both models. Put differently, stocks that are high risk are likely to become constrained, even controlling for persistence in constraints (in model 2). This implies that a short investing strategy that considers a position in a stock already somewhat constrained should already know that this is a risky stock and therefore a risky position.
B. Investment Horizon
Next, we consider the investment horizon of the two strategies. There is a distinction in the literature, where studies of short activity focus on short horizons (weekly) and studies on short constraints focus on long horizons (monthly). A notable exception is Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang (2008) , who measure short selling activity over a week and measure returns over the subsequent month. However, to our knowledge, there is no study testing the limits of how long predictability is maintained, and thus provide an estimate of an investment horizon for a trading strategy.
Results in Table X show how well short-selling activity and constraints predict future returns at different horizons. As a way to reduce overlapping measurement while maintaining a short interval, we aggregate our daily data to the weekly frequency. We measure short activity as the raw net total demand change scaled by weekly volume and we measure the constraint variable as of the beginning of the week. To decompose this weekly activity measure into short activity and short covering, we aggregate the numerator and denominator separately, divide, then zero out the negative and positive values, respectively. We vary the dependent variable from one week (model 1) up to twelve weeks (model 12) ahead with non-overlapping returns. Our results
show that short trading and short investing have two distinct investment horizons. Short activity only predicts negative returns at the one week horizon. Models 4 and 6 show some predictability but we interpret this as just noise since it is not consistent. The combination of model 1 and model 4 can be interpreted as consistent with Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang (2008) , and indeed if we aggregate to monthly returns, we find results consistent with theirs. Overall, short activity is only predictive of negative returns up to approximately one month at most. In contrast, constraints begin predicting returns at the one-month horizon, as seen in model 4 and beyond.
This implies the information correlated with the constraint is long-lived and motivates our investigation around information events.
The results on investment horizon imply that short selling constraints are persistent, so we investigate further. In Table XI , we show some simple univariate statistics on short constraints as events, where a Constraint Event is defined as a sequence of months, within a given firm, where every month meets our definition of short constrained. By definition, the minimum length is 2 months. Table XI shows that the mean length is 8.9 months, and the median is 5 months. 17 To further identify the limit to the horizon of short selling constraints, we turn to Table XII , which investigates how long lagged short selling constraints predict returns at a monthly frequency. Recall, in Table X , there was predictability up to 12 weeks, or approximately 3 months. Here, with monthly data, we show predictability up to 7 months lagged, which corroborates our computations above regarding the length of constraint events. Table XII implies that a short investment strategy should last, on average, seven months to capture all of the negative price adjustment for a short-constrained stock.
C. Information sets
To investigate varying information sets, we consider analyst downgrades as in Christophe, Ferri, and Hsieh (2010) and negative earnings announcements as in Christophe, Ferri, and Angel (2004) . Christophe, Ferri, and Hsieh (2010) find that short sellers anticipate downgrades by trading ahead of them, and test whether this result is due to 'tipping' or instead due to fundamental analysis of publicly available information. They conclude that their result is due to tipping -i.e. analysts somehow communicate to other market participants that new information is forthcoming. Christophe, Ferri, and Angel (2004) find that short sellers trade in anticipation of earnings announcements, and that more activity is associated with larger (negative) post-announcement returns.
We revisit these two results in light of our finding that short sellers are not a uniform group. Specifically, we split the two event samples (Analyst Downgrades and Earnings Announcements) into our three groupings by short selling constraints: constrained, unconstrained, and transient (neither). Then, we separately investigate both stock returns and short selling activity around the events within each of these categories.
Our specification is an event study framework, but we estimate it using panel data techniques so we can again use firm and time fixed effects and double-clustered standard errors.
Specifically, this means we set indicator variables for each of the timeframes listed, as explanatory variables. Because this is a complete specification, we use no other intercept to avoid collinearity. Thus, we are effectively computing mean values for each variable in each time interval around the event as described. Fama-French adjusted returns are raw returns that subtract off the 25-portfolio matched Fama-French portfolio return. We show similar results for raw returns, unreported.
The results for Fama-French adjusted returns around analyst downgrades are in Table   XIII . The most important result in this table is the event day return, identified in the row marked Time (0). In model 3, the event return is −3.57%, which is a large, daily return for constrained stocks. This is almost double the event day return of −1.89% among unconstrained stocks (in model 2). The difference between these two coefficients is statistically significant. The rest of the table shows an expected pattern, with some positive results ahead of the downgrade, and negative results on the event day and afterwards, all consistent with newly revealed negative information, with some drift. Table XIV shows the same specification, but now with short activity instead of returns.
The null hypothesis for each coefficient in this table is not zero, however. Unconstrained stocks have very low aggregate short demand, and so are more likely to see short selling. Said differently, their mean short demand is near zero, at which the distribution is truncated.
Conversely, constrained stocks have high aggregate short demand and so are more likely to see covering activity (i.e. they are close to the upper bound). Therefore, we run a placebo test to establish the correct null hypothesis for each coefficient. We do this by randomly drawing a placebo "event" day from each of the four samples: ALL, UNCONST, CONST and TRANS matching the sample size of each, and ensuring that there is no event overlap. Then we run the same statistical analysis, iterating 300 times. We then use these placebo coefficients as our null hypothesis for each coefficient test. The original results and placebo coefficients are available in the Appendix. The most substantial corrections are among the CONST subsample, where the placebo coefficients range from −0.0111 to −0.0300 and are statistically different from zero.
In all samples, we see some short selling ahead of the event. Only in the UNCONST sample (model 2) do we see it before day T−2. This combined with the previous table's result around event returns reinforces the primary result in Christophe, Ferri, and Hsieh (2010) . There are some important differences in magnitude, however. The pre-event cumulative short selling is similar among unconstrained (0.0266 + 0.0059 = 0.0325 vs 0.0362), but the event day short selling is substantially larger among constrained stocks (0.0165 vs 0.0061). This indicates stronger beliefs that there is a larger expected negative return.
Even more striking is the covering activity post-event. The (3,10) coefficient for the constrained sample is −0.1396, which indicates that −13.96% of volume in that time period represents covering transactions. This compares with just −4.29% among the unconstrained stocks. This substantial covering activity is an indicator that there were long-lived short positions prior to the event window (day T−10) that are closing after the analyst downgrade since net covering is much larger than short selling ahead of the event.
Christophe, Ferri, and Hsieh (2010) provided evidence that there was 'tipping' of some sort happening ahead of analyst downgrades, and this could be what it meant for short sellers to be 'informed' ahead of analyst downgrades. We concur, but our results complete the picture.
Instead of rejecting the hypothesis of short sellers using publicly available firm fundamentals as they do, our results are also consistent with a short investing strategy using long-lived information and the analyst downgrade revealing it clearly to the public. Dechow et al. (2001) has shown that short sellers do, in fact, use fundamental information to inform their trades. Our results show that constrained stocks have the largest return response, but with similar short activity ahead of time. This is consistent with longer-lived negative beliefs about a stock with positions in place before the 21-day symmetric window around analyst downgrades. The analyst downgrade clearly reveals the negative information already obtained (or perhaps processed using publicly available information) by a longer-term short investor.
We find more evidence of this when we consider returns and activity around negative earnings surprises in Table XV and Table XVI , respectively. Table XV shows that there is a similar return result regardless of subsample. We interpret the weaker statistical significance among the constrained sample to be a function of the significantly smaller sample size compared to the other subsamples. We measure this using the bottom quintile of earnings surprises using analyst expectations (SUE3) but find very similar results with other specifications.
18 Table XVI shows the results for short activity. This time, our placebo test computes baseline coefficients around all earnings announcements regardless of whether there is a surprise or not, and thus is not a bootstrap test. Instead, this placebo captures "normal" short selling around earnings announcements. It has the same effect of controlling for the fact that the null hypothesis for our coefficient tests is not likely to be zero. In this case, it is not likely to be zero both because of the baseline demand in each sample, as described above, but also because earnings announcements are publicly known ahead of time and thus likely attract short selling or covering activity regardless of outcome. Among constrained stocks, however, there is uniformly no short selling activity. It is possible that this non-result is due to low power, since we have a sample of just 1,156 negative earnings surprises among short constrained stocks. However, the t-statistics never exceed even 0.709 in absolute value, so they are not close to being statistically significant. While 1,156 is a small sample in financial economics, it is not in any general statistical sense. Indeed, the placebo results in the CONST sample for all earnings announcements has a sample size of 2,833 and finds multiple statistically significant coefficients (see the Appendix). What we find, then, is that short selling around negative earnings surprises in constrained stocks is no different than the average for any constrained stocks around earnings announcements in general.
We interpret this finding that short sellers had previously established a short position due to the firm's weak fundamentals and capture the negative announcement return as a part of the long-term short strategy. They do not trade on the event as much as they hold their position through it. This implies that short investors use long-lived, fundamental information. They have already established their very costly short position and have held it for a while. The fact that the stock is expensive to borrow is itself a signal to owners that they may want to sell, and the negative earnings surprise further communicates this to current owners. Since we find a negative event return and no material short selling activity, these results are consistent with current owners selling their holdings, and thus beginning to agree with the longer term short investors.
D. Price efficiency
As a final test, we consider price efficiency. Using the Delay measure in Hou and Moskowitz (2005) as the dependent variable, we show that short activity increases price efficiency (lowers Delay) as already shown in the literature (Boehmer and Wu (2013) ). This is shown in Table XVII , row 3, where the coefficient on Short Activity is negative and significant.
However, we further show that short constrained stocks are associated with worse price efficiency (higher delay), as shown by the positive and significant coefficient on the constraint indicator. In Model 5, when we interact the two, the interaction term is not significant, meaning that the two effectively cancel each other out. When stocks are constrained, short activity does not impact price efficiency, and vice versa. This result can be seen as a slight clarification of the joint results in Boehmer and Wu (2013) and Saffi and Sigurdsson (2011) .
Due to the definition of the delay measure, these results are isolated to short-term price efficiency. Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) show that constrained stocks likely will exhibit delays in incorporating negative information. If those delays last as long as the constraints, which can last 5-9 months, then a weekly measure of price efficiency is not sufficient to capture the effect. To determine if short constrained stocks also contribute to price efficiency, a new, longterm measure of price efficiency needs to be developed. This non-trivial task we leave to future research.
V. Conclusion
The literature on short selling has robustly shown that short sellers are informed and help correct overpricing. We have shown that these results can be used to characterize two distinct short selling strategies, which we have termed short trading and short investing.
Short investing faces short constraints. These positions are higher risk, measured both in terms of the stock volatility and the loan fee variance (short selling risk). If we assume that short investors want to capture the entire negative return associated with constraints, then their investment horizon must be between 5 and 9 months. This reflects the long-lasting nature of short selling constraint events and the distance at which constraints continue to predict negative returns.
Short investments (measured by short constraints) are also likely higher reward, since they are associated with greater negative returns around analyst downgrades, for instance. The returns to a short sale are hard to quantify, however, so conclusions around the profitability of short investors is mostly conjecture with indirect evidence. A short investing strategy incorporates long-lived information, such as firm fundamental information, into stock prices. It is possible that traders who use this strategy are superior information processors, obtaining public information and distilling out the pertinent portions to come to their bearish stance. We do not test this directly, but it is consistent with our results.
The short trading strategy, in contrast, faces no short constraints. These positions are shorter horizon and lower risk, as measured by short selling risk. This lower short selling risk is further mitigated because of the shorter holding period, which is likely one week, though we have weak evidence that it could be up to one month. The short trading strategy exploits shortlived information such as analyst downgrades, earnings surprises, or post-earnings announcement drift. They quickly enter the trade, capture the event return, and cover their position.
A small but material contribution of our paper is also the two new measures of short activity and short constraints. We show how to decompose changes in daily short interest into Short Activity and Cover Activity, and how they should be used in lieu of exchange-based short volume to measure higher frequency short selling activity. We also show that short constraints are persistent, and therefore a superior measure of short constraints is aggregates daily short constraints. We suggest a 42-day lagged window.
Overall, the distinction between activity and constraints, and moreover that of short investing versus short trading, has important implications for future research on short selling.
This distinction highlights the process of correcting overpricing and informed short selling in two very different scenarios: short constrained versus not. Our results can be thought of as quantifying the theory in Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) -the delay in negative information incorporation into prices due to short selling constraints is on the order of months, which is a significant delay given that most estimates of information incorporation are on the order of a few hours (Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2005) ).
We suggest that future theoretical research can help shed light on this dual equilibrium regarding short selling constraints. As previously stated, we cannot make causal statements. . Panel E plots raw short activity (change in demand, divided by total daily volume, in red) and its 42-day moving average (black). The constraint indicator is 1 when the DCBS > 1 for 42 days. High short activity indicator is top quintile of activity, grouped daily, high covering activity is bottom quintile of activity, grouped daily. and covering activity (purple). Panel E plots raw short activity (change in demand, divided by total daily volume, in red) and its 42-day moving average (black). The constraint indicator is 1 when the DCBS > 1 for 42 days. High short activity indicator is top quintile of activity, grouped daily, high covering activity is bottom quintile of activity, grouped daily. . Short activity is computed as the change in daily short interest divided by total daily volume. We further separate out activity by computing an asymmetric measure which takes the value of short activity if it is positive and zero otherwise. Cover activity takes the opposite position and is negative if we observe net short cover activity and zero otherwise. Spread is the bid-ask difference divided by the midpoint. Order Imbalance Plus is an asymmetric order imbalances measure computed from TAQ, where negative numbers are set to zero. High -Low is the intraday high price minus the intraday low price. Turnover is monthly share volume divided by end-of-month shares outstanding. Raw returns are from CRSP, and Volatility and Short Selling Risk are computed over the trailing 12 months with daily returns, annualized. Adjusted returns are daily returns less the matched 25-portfolio Fama-French portfolio return. Constraint (CONST) is an indicator set to 1 if the past 42 days all had a Daily Cost to Borrow Score (DCBS) greater than 1, Unconstrained (UNCONST) is the same, except DCBS = 1 for 42 days. Transient (TRANS) an indicator for the remaining, in between, set of observations. This table plots a frequency table of the distribution of stock-month observations, sorted into groups by monthly average lending fee (bps). Each bin contains observations that are less than or equal to the label but greater than the one above it. For example, the observations in the less-than-300-bps bin also are greater than 100 bps, and the observations in the less-than-100-bps bin all are greater than 0. Listed in each cell are percentages within each columnar group. The bottom row lists the total observations for each column, and just above it is the percentage of the total sample represented by that column. Constrained specifies when 100% of trading days in a stock-month and prior stock-month have daily cost-to-borrow scores of 2 or greater. Unconstrained specifies when 100% of trading days in a stock-month and prior stock-month have daily cost-to-borrow scores equal to 1 (i.e., less than 2). Transient indicates that both indicators are zero and so represents stocks that are neither constrained nor unconstrained. The dependent variable is the T+1 monthly raw return. Raw returns are from CRSP. SPECIAL is an indicator for monthly average loan fees > 100 bps. Constrained specifies when 100% of trading days in a stock-month and prior stockmonth have daily cost-to-borrow scores of 2 or greater. Const 1 Indicator includes only the current month. Const 1 80% Ind includes only the current month with an 80% threshold. Const 80% Ind is the same as Constrained, but with a threshold of 80% not 100%. Const 3 Indicator is the same as Constrained but also includes month T+1. Controls (omitted for brevity) include the following. The market-to-book ratio (Market-to-Book) is computed as in Daniel and Titman (2006) , using end-of-month market capitalization for market equity, logged. Market Cap is the log of end-ofmonth shares outstanding times price in $M. Volatility is computed over the trailing 12 months with monthly returns, annualized and logged. Spread is the log of the bid-ask difference divided by the midpoint. Return is the time T return, and Lagged Return is the time T−1 return. The panel data specification uses time and firm fixed effects, and standard errors are clustered by time and firm. *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Table IV Calibration of short activity measure Data are daily from June 2006 to September 2016. The dependent variable is the Constraint measure (CONST) at day T+42, which captures future constraints over days T+1 to T+42. Short Activity is measured as the change in daily short interest divided by total daily volume, with all negative values set to zero, thus isolating only positive changes in short interest. Cover Activity is the same but sets positive values to zero. CONST is the constraint indicator, measured over the trailing 42 days. Return is the current day's event return. Spread is the effective spread computed from intraday data. Order Imbalance is measured as the number of buys less sells scaled by the number of trades where trades are signed using Lee and Ready (1991) with a zero second delay. High -Low price is the high minus low intra-day price. Turnover is daily volume divided by shares outstanding. We include firm and day FE, with standard errors clustered by firm and day. Tstatistics are displayed in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Activity is measured as the change in daily short interest divided by total daily volume, winsorized at zero. Constrained (CONST) is defined as being expensive-to-borrow (DCBS > 1) for the past 42 days. Unconstrained (UNCONST) is defined as being cheap-to-borrow (DCBS=1) in the past 42 days. Transient (TRANS) is the remaining sample that is neither. Past Return is the cumulative raw return from day t-5 to t-1. Return is the event day return. Spread is the effective spread computed from intraday data. Order Imbalance is number of buy orders less the number of sell orders divided by total orders, truncated at zero. Short Activity [-5, -1] is lagged short activity, cumulative over the 5 days prior. High-Low Prices the intraday high and low price for the stock. Turnover is the average turnover over the five days prior to day t. We include firm and day FE, with standard errors clustered by firm and day. T-statistics are displayed in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
(1) . Short Activity is measured as the change in daily short interest divided by total daily volume, with all negative values set to zero, thus isolating only positive changes in short interest. Cover Activity is the same but sets positive values to zero. Constrained (CONST) is defined as being expensive-to-borrow (DCBS > 1) for the past 42 days. Unconstrained (UNCONST) is defined as being cheap-to-borrow (DCBS=1) in the past 42 days. Transient (TRANS) is the remaining sample that is neither. Return [-5,-1] is the cumulative raw return from day t-5 to t-1. Spread is the effective spread computed from intraday data. Order Imbalance is number of buy orders less the number of sell orders divided by total orders, truncated at zero. High-Low Prices the intraday high and low price for the stock. Turnover is the average turnover over the five days prior to day t. We include firm and day FE, with standard errors clustered by firm and day. Tstatistics are displayed in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) Engelberg, Reed, and Ringgenberg (2017) . Volatility (Panel B) is computed daily over the trailing year, annualized. Constrained (CONST) is defined as being expensive-to-borrow (DCBS > 1) for the past 42 days. Unconstrained (UNCONST) is defined as being cheap-to-borrow (DCBS=1) in the past 42 days. Transient (TRANS) is the remaining sample that is neither. Pooled is the entire sample across rows, Total is the entire sample across columns. Short (and Cover) activity is divided into quintiles, daily. Engelberg, Reed, and Ringgenberg (2017) . Volatility is computed daily over the trailing year, annualized. Constrained (CONST) is defined as being expensive-to-borrow (DCBS > 1) for the past 42 days. Short Activity is measured as the change in daily short interest divided by total daily volume, with all negative values set to zero, thus isolating only positive changes in short interest. Cover Activity is the same but sets positive values to zero. Included but not shown for brevity: Return [-5,-1] is the cumulative raw return from day t-5 to t-1. Return is the event day return. Spread is the effective spread computed from intraday data. Order Imbalance is number of buy orders less the number of sell orders divided by total orders, truncated at zero. High-Low Prices the intraday high and low price for the stock. Turnover is the average turnover over the five days prior to day t. Ln(Price) is the log of the firm's stock price. We include firm and day FE, with standard errors clustered by firm and day. Tstatistics are displayed in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
(1) returns, where the raw holding period return is subtracted from the portfolio-matched Fama-French portfolio holding period return. Constrained (CONST) is defined as being expensive-to-borrow (DCBS > 1) for the past 42 days. Short Activity is measured as the change in daily short interest divided by total daily volume, with all negative values set to zero, thus isolating only positive changes in short interest, aggregated weekly. Cover Activity is the same but sets positive values to zero. Return is the current weekly return. Effective Spread is the weekly average intraday effective spread. Order Imbalance is number of buy orders less the number of sell orders divided by total orders, truncated at zero. High-Low Prices the average weekly intraday high and low price for the stock. Turnover is the average weekly turnover. We include firm and week FE, with standard errors clustered by firm and week. Tstatistics are displayed in parentheses. Standard errors clustered by firm and month. *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
(1) Table XI Distribution of short-constraint event characteristics A short-constraint event or "Constraint Event" is defined as two months during which every trading day has a daily cost-to-borrow score greater than 1, and so by definition it has a minimum length of two months. The length of events in Panel A is measured in months, and is defined simply as a sequence of months in which every month meets the definition of short constrained. Panel B only shows data for firms having at least one PERSIST event. Daniel and Titman (2006) , using end-of-month market capitalization for market equity, logged. Market Cap is the log of end-of-month shares outstanding times price in $M. Volatility is computed over the trailing 12 months with monthly returns, annualized and logged. Spread is the log of the bid-ask difference divided by the midpoint. Return is the time T return, and Lagged Return is the time T−1 return. CONST specifies when 100% of trading days in a stock-month and prior stock-month have daily cost-to-borrow scores of 2 or greater. The analysis is a panel regression with both month and firm fixed effects and doubleclustered standard errors. *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) return, which is raw return less the five by five Fama and French matched portfolio return. The independent variables are indicators for the time intervals displayed, and so there is no constant to avoid collinearity nor are there fixed effects. Constrained (CONST) is defined as being expensiveto-borrow (DCBS > 1) for the past 42 days. Unconstrained (UNCONST) is defined as being cheapto-borrow (DCBS=1) in the past 42 days. Transient (TRANS) is the remaining sample that is neither. Each state is determined at time T−10. T-statistics are displayed in parentheses. Standard errors clustered by firm and month. *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3)
Time (-10,-3) 0.0118*** 0.0100*** 0.0225*** 0.0160** Activity, is measured as the change in daily short interest divided by total daily volume. The independent variables are indicators for the time intervals displayed, and so there is no constant to avoid collinearity nor are there fixed effects. Constrained (CONST) is defined as being expensive-toborrow (DCBS > 1) for the past 42 days. Unconstrained (UNCONST) is defined as being cheapto-borrow (DCBS = 1) in the past 42 days. Transient (TRANS) is the remaining sample that is neither. Coefficients are tested against bootstrapped coefficients, where event days are drawn at random from the four different subsets to match the sample size of each subset. This is to account for the fact the UNCONST subset has low short demand and so on average has positive short selling and the CONST subset has high short demand and so on average as negative short selling (covering). The null hypothesis in each subset is not necessarily zero. Each state is determined at time T−10. T-statistics are displayed in parentheses. Standard errors clustered by firm and month. *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) return, which is raw return less the five by five Fama and French matched portfolio return. The independent variables are indicators for the time intervals displayed, and so there is no constant to avoid collinearity nor are there fixed effects. Constrained (CONST) is defined as being expensiveto-borrow (DCBS > 1) for the past 42 days. Unconstrained (UNCONST) is defined as being cheapto-borrow (DCBS=1) in the past 42 days. Transient (TRANS) is the remaining sample that is neither. Each state is determined at time T−10. We measure earnings surprises based on Analyst Estimates (SUE3), but results for other specifications are similar. Only the bottom quintile is used to identify negative earnings surprises. T-statistics are displayed in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) Activity, is measured as the change in daily short interest divided by total daily volume. The independent variables are indicators for the time intervals displayed, and so there is no constant to avoid collinearity. Constrained (CONST) is defined as being expensive-to-borrow (DCBS > 1) for the past 42 days. Unconstrained (UNCONST) is defined as being cheap-to-borrow (DCBS = 1) in the past 42 days. Transient (TRANS) is the remaining sample that is neither. Each state is determined at time T−10. We measure earnings surprises with analyst expectations (SUE3). Only the bottom quintile is used to identify negative earnings surprises. Coefficients are tested against placebo coefficients drawn by estimating activity around all earnings announcements regardless of surprise status, not against a null of 0. Because earnings announcements are known information events, we cannot assume that the null hypothesis should be zero short selling or covering around these events. T-statistics are displayed in parentheses. Standard errors clustered by firm and month. *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) Hou and Moskowitz (2005) . Constrained (CONST) is defined as being expensive-to-borrow (DCBS > 1) for the past 42 days. Unconstrained (UNCONST) is defined as being cheap-to-borrow (DCBS = 1) in the past 42 days. Transient (TRANS) is the remaining sample that is neither. Short Activity is measured as the change in daily short interest divided by total daily volume, with negative values set to zero. Cover Activity is the same, but positive values are set to zero t-statistics are displayed in parentheses. Return [−5, −1] is the cumulative raw return from day t−5 to t−1. Eff Spread is the effective spread computed from intraday TAQ data. Order Imbalance is number of buy orders less the number of sell orders divided by total orders, winsorized at zero. High-Low Prices the intraday high and low price for the stock. Turnover is the average turnover over the five days prior to day t. We include firm and day FE, with standard errors clustered by firm and day. Standard errors clustered by firm and month. *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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